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THE OPEN ECONOMY: JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE
POSITION OF THE JUDICIARY
ERNEST J. BROWNt
"1 do not think the United States would cone to ans end if we lost our
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be
imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several
States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those
who arc not trained to national views and how often action is taken that
embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant to end."
-HoLmES, Law and the Court,
in CoLLECrTED LEGAL. PAPERS 291, 295-96 (1920).
THAT Justice Frankfurter's first Supreme Court opinion should be one hold-
ing a state statute unconstitutional seemed at the time an amusing irony, easy
and inevitable though the Court's unanimous decision appeared to be.' That
subsequent opinions and votes indicated a large and generalized tolerance of
state legislation, whatever the source or nature of the challenge, seemed entire-
ly in character for one who had often invoked the classic statements of James
Bradley Thayer or Justice Holmes and urged restraint and hesitance as the
appropriate attitude of a constitutional judge.2 That in later years Justice
Frankfurter should not infrequently find merit in claims of conflict between
state legislation and the commerce clause, even while he maintained a limiting
view of the proper scope of judicial activity,3 has to some seemed paradox.
But paradox abounds, for those who seek it, in the ifistitutions of American
constitutional law. That a government democratic in base and representative
in method should have what are thought to be its shaping and fundamental
decisions made by the majority of a small group of men appointed for life is
paradox enough. That the questions requiring those decisions should be pre-
sented in the haphazard of litigation, either wholly private or private in instiga-
tion or defense, and by lawyers chosen fortuitously and often without reference
to special competence, is even greater paradox.
Paradox, however, is only seeming contradiction. If it presents the inter-
secting thrusts of ideas each of which enjoys acceptance, it shares that attribute
with the controversies which take place in every active field of the law, and
perhaps particularly in constitutional law.4 As with those controversies, resolu-
tProfessor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939).
2. E.g., Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, '177 (1942) (dissenting
opinion) ; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940) ; Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
3. Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L. REv. 217, 234-38
(1955), reprinted in FRANKFURTE, OF LAW AND MEN 3, 24-30 (1956).
4. Cf. Frankfurter, Some Observations on the Nature of the Judicial Process of Su-
preme Court Litigation, 98 PROCEEDINGS, AMERIcAN PHLosopsHicAIL Socnr~ 233, 239
(1954), reprinted in FRAxxFuRTER, OF LAW AN MEN 31, 43 (1,956).
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tion requires accommodation and adjustment rather than extrapolation of doc-
trine. The paradoxes involved in permitting individuals, without official sanc-
tion and often in the face of official displeasure, to invoke the assurances of the
Constitution, and the paradoxes in seeking, within institutions largely flexible.
a measure of stability of structure and values through review by judges whose
detachment fulfills their function, if not all of their desirable qualifications, have,
as might have been expected, produced their doctrinal responses. Under such
heads as "standing," "ripeness," "case or controversy" and "judicial restraint,"
these responses have in the aggregate presented the problem of the judicial
function which has been the overriding concern of Justice Frankfurter both on
and off the bench. It should be remembered, however, that these are doctrines
of adjustment and accommodation. It seems unlikely that internal rigidity
would serve their purpose.
That restraint and hesitance to interpose a constitutional veto should in many,
or even most, instances be the appropriate judicial attitude does not necessarily
mean that the occasions should be undifferentiated. James Bradley Thayer
would apparently have recognized little or no difference, whether the Court
was considering the scope of federal powers or a state statute challenged under
the commerce clause as hostile to the federal system.5 Quite apart from ab-
stract ideas of the coequality of the several branches of the federal government,
Herbert Wechsler has demonstrated why the structure of our government
should make judges particularly hesitant to hold federal legislation beyond the
scope of the powers granted to the central government.6 Without attempting
present decision of the matter, one may ask whether the constitutional negatives
upon the national, government's action do not involve different considerations
and hence make appropriate somewhat different methods and standards of ad-
justment. Justice Brandeis urged a broad tolerance of state legislation against
a claim that its substance went beyond the fluid standards of that process which
is "due"; he pointed out that, within the isolated chambers of the states, the
risks from legislation proving harmful were limited, while the lessons of benefit
or of harm could be learned universally. 7 Justice Holmes must inevitably have
agreed with these sentiments had he still been a member of the Court.8 Yet
almost twenty years before, in the words which introduce this paper, he had
acknowledged one of the lessons of judicial experience-when the limits that the
federal system imposes upon its components are in question, when the centri-
fugal, isolating or hostile forces of localism are manifested in state legislation,
the interests of union require that these factors be recognized and the judicial
negative 'be interposed. It was hardly necessary to add what some of the Jus-
5. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HAgv. L. REv. 129 (1893); 2 THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2190 (1895).
6. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUm. L. Rv. 543, 559
(1954), reprinted in FEDERALism MATURE AND ENERGENT 97, 109 (Macmahon ed. 1955).
7. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306-11 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
& See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
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tice's successors have not always recognized-the Court might the more readily
intervene against state legislation under a commerce clause challenge, since it
would at most make what it believed a proper allocation of power, tentative
and subject to reallocation by Congress; a negative in the name of substantive
due process was, however, presumably universal and final. justice Holmes's
observation is the more significant since he was not notably sensitive to the
presence of an excessive localism.9 In this area at least, experience must have
found him a somewhat reluctant pupil.
Twenty years and more ago, the then Professor Frankfurter wrote of "one
of the greatest duties of a judge, the duty not to enlarge his authority."'1
Acknowledging the preponderant truth of this observation, one may speculate
that the Justice's experience in the intervening years has contributed to the
definition of the authority, and of the duty. At the same time, he went on to
say:
"For a court to hold that decision does not belong to it, is merely to recog-
nize that a problem calls for the exercise of initiative and experimentation
possessed only by political processes, and should not be subjected to the
confined procedure of a lawsuit and the uncreative resources of judicial
review."1'
Written in a discussion of state legislation and the commerce clause, these words
were echoed from the bench in a jointly signed opinion only a few years later:
"Judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative regulations-
must from inherent limitations of the judicial process treat the subject by
the hit-and-miss method of deciding single local controversies upon evi-
dence and information limited by the narrow rules of litigation. Spasmodic
and unrelated instances of litigation cannot afford an adequate basis for the
creation of integrated national rules which alone can afford that full pro-
tection for interstate commerce intended by the Constitution. We would,
therefore, leave the questions raised by the Arkansas tax for consideration
of Congress .... ,,12
These are brave words. But no Justice since Chief Justice Taney, the joint
authors included, has consistently followed their implications. For Chancellor
Kent of New York, the commerce clause afforded no judicially discoverable
negative upon state statutes other than conflicting federal legislation.13 James
Bradley Thayer approved this position.14 And it perhaps approximated the
opinion of Chief Justice Taney, though even he concurred in the heavily qualify-
9. Cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 600 (1923) (dissenting opinion);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 52 (1910) (dissenting
opinion).
10. FRANKFURTER, THE CommERcE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
80 (1937) (hereinafter cited as THE CoMMERCE CLAUSE).
11. Id. at96.
12. Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, JJ., dissenting in McCarroll v. Dixie Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940).
13. See Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 572-80 (N.Y. 1812).
14. 2 THAYER, CASES ON CoNsTiTUTIoNAL LAW 2190 (1895).
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ing opinion of Justice Curtis in Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens.1 If Justice
Frankfurter brought this attitude or understanding to the Court, the enlighten-
ment afforded by judicial experience had clearly modified it by the time of his
concurring opinion in Carter v. Virginia 16 and his concurrence with the major-
ity opinion in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona.17 His dissent in Capitol Grey-
hound Lines v. Brice completes the change in emphasis and approach:
"Once more we are called upon to subject a State tax on interstate motor
traffic to the scrutiny which the Commerce Clause requires so that inter-
state commerce may enjoy freedom from State taxation outside of those
narrow limits within which States are free to burden such commerce."' s
Had the views of Kent and Thayer prevailed, one cannot say that our system
would have been unworkable. But the very mechanisms of our government, or
perhaps the lack of them, would have multiplied frictions and strains which we
have been spared. These mechanisms do not give to Congress any regularized
opportunity or duty of reviewing, to test for compatibility with the federal
system, state statutes even in their skeletal form as enacted, much less as fleshed
by application, interpretation and administration. Nor has Congress been so
idle that such matters could be assured a place on its agenda without competition
from other business which might often be deemed more pressing; in Justice
Jackson's phrase, the inertia of government would be heavily on the side of the
centrifugal forces of localism.' 9 Moreover, as Paul Freund has suggested, it
is perhaps as well that members of Congress have not been given the additional
task of corralling, by quid pro quo or otherwise, votes and support on behalf of
their constituencies for or against specific local legislation.20 Nor do the largely
unsuccessful attempts of judges and commentators to formulate rules applicable
in the field of commerce suggest that Congress could by legislation in generalized
terms give in advance adequate or satisfactory guidance to the courts.
From at least the Cooley decision onward, the Justices, some of them more
and some of them less frequently, have found occasions where the implications
from the commerce clause unaided by legislation have seemed to them to war-
rant interposing a negative against state legislation. They have usually been
the result of an appraisal more carefully particularized than legislation could
afford and, one feels, than many opinions have disclosed. These occasions have
at times been such as to produce helpful congressional reaction."' But the occa-
sions are not to be found specified in the Constitution. Justices may talk, often
with vigor and not infrequently in dissent, of judicial legislation, even of trying
statutes, and of the fact that the Constitution authorizes Congress, not the
15. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 318 (1851).
16. 321 U.S. 131, 139 (1944).
17. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
18. 339 U.S. 542, 548 (1950).
19. Duckvorth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941).
20. Freund, Unpiring the Federal Systen, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 561 (1954), reprinted
in FEDEALISM MATURE AND EMERGENT 159 (Macmahon ed. 1955).
21. See FAIANu.A, MR. JUSTICE MnmE AND THE SUPREME CouRT 314 (1939).
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Court, to regulate commerce. But this is not the line of division. Division
arises in deciding whether the Court.should intervene in a particular instance,
not whether it should ever do so. And decision has found few generalized
guides. As explicit constitutional and legislative guides have been absent, judi-
cially made or discovered formulations have been inadequate. Differences in
appraisal, and sharp ones, have arisen. But on the whole, these differences seem
to have been less important than differences in perception. Although the im-
pression is not susceptible of proof, the decisions seem adequate, and even wise,
to the extent that the particular interests at stake, long-range as well as short,
have been perceived and understood.
STATE TAXATION AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: A CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM
For the past twenty-five years, it has been the frequently and officially pro-
claimed policy of the government of the United States that barriers to inter-
national trade should be lowered, and that efforts to that end should be constant
and unremitting. Not without hesitation, vacillation and some backsliding, it has
followed this policy by legislation, agreement and treaty. With some measure
of success, it has urged the benefits of such a policy upon its friends and allies,
particularly in Western Europe. There has been interested, and perhaps other,
opposition on occasion, but these policies have received a remarkable near-
unanimity of support from academic and detached opinion in the United States.
Ouite in contrast has been academic legal opinion when state taxes have
been challenged in the Supreme Court as barriers to trade within the United
States. Whether state taxes were challenged under the rubric of jurisdiction
to tax, or of the commerce clause, this body of opinion has with remarkable
concert supported decisions upholding them and has questioned those decisions
limiting their incidence.22
This divergence of opinion may be explained in several ways. It may be that
the challenges to internal taxes have been largely groundless, weighed on any
rational scale. Some apparently believe this, but it seems open to doubt, and
should be investigated. Or it may be that legal commentators would be national-
ist and protectionist if they were considering international trade, and but follow
the same bent in internal matters. There is little evidence that this is true, and it
seems improbable. Not only is there clear awareness of our historic commitment
to a certain degree of freedom of internal trade and movement, but there is
general acceptance of the condemnation of state statutes which are clearly and
22. See, e.g., Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce
Clause to State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 740 (1953), and Barrett, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce, 4 VAN'D. L. Rzv. 496 (1951) ; Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-State
Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947) ; Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate
Transactions, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 211 (1947); Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate
Commerce, 9 VAND. L. REV. 138 (1956); Hellerstein & Hennefeld, State Taxation in a
National Economy, 54 HARv. L. R~v. 949 (1941) ; Lockhart, State Tax Barriers to Inter-
state Trade, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1253 (1940), and Lockhart, The Sales Tax it Interstate
Commerce, 52 HARv. L. REv. 617 (1939).
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indisputably preferential.2 A third possibility is that it is adhesion to the doc-
trinal purity of the Kent-Thayer tradition which has produced disapproval of
those instances when the 'Court has held state tax legislation inoperative. But
this doctrinal purity would be heavily compromised by the decisions which are
accepted; yielding to pragmatic considerations not rarely, doctrinal purity when
invoked can be only a makeweight. As a final possibility, the identity of the
litigants may have had some influence in inducing approval or disapproval of
decisions. There is more than one hint, in both judicial writing and that of com-
mentators, that in a contest between the state (should one say "any state" ?)
and commercial enterprise-usually corporate commercial enterprise-the
claims of the latter start with the handicap of a less worthy motive and pur-
pose. Of course, to permit such coloration of opinion is to overlook the fact that
in the international field, nnutatis mutandis, it is the same commercial enter-
prise, the same corporate commercial enterprise, which carries on the functions
of transportation and distribution and must, at least in first impact, disburse
for tariffs, tolls and taxes. It is one of the perhaps unfortunate concomitants
of our case system of constitutional controversy that the identity of the im-
mediate litigant, rather than the ultimate interests involved, may color opinion
concerning the decision-that cause and champion may be unnecessarily identi-
fied. In his lectures on the commerce clause, Professor Frankfurter pointed
out:
"The checkered fortunes in the conflict between national and state powers,
as resolved by the Supreme Court, are partly due to the fact that the respec-
tive claims have not come before the Court in their full amplitude, but have
been entangled in specific controversies arousing the emotions and alle-
giances of the moment."
24
More recently Justice Frankfurter has had occasion to remind us, "it is true of
this principle, as of others, that the principle is not to be reduced to the appeal of
the particular instance in which it is invoked. '25
Whatever the reason for this body of opinion, it appears to have achieved a
substantial consensus, even though there are difficulties in detailed formulation
and application. This consensus, very generally stated, is that to safeguard our
internal open market, we must protect interstate commerce against discrimina-
tory taxation, but that is the extent of our concern with state taxes. It is recog-
nized that "discrimination" and "discriminatory" are not self-defining terms,
and that they are not to be limited to legislation which is patently hostile to the
nonlocal. Rather, it is acknowledged that in its competition with local business,
the interstate is not to be disadvantaged because it is interstate, that "it shall not
be burdened with cumulative exactions which are not similarly laid on local
business."'26 To achieve this end, we consider "multiple burdens," we employ
23. See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
24. THE COiERCE CLAUSE 23.
25. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329,
340 (1951).
26. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258 (1938).
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"apportionment," and similar devices. "Interstate commerce must pay its way"
-this states the goal and the judgment.2 7 Discrimination, intentional or for-
tuitous, is bad, but equality is its own justification, and is all we need seek. By
such a formulation, we eliminate the unmerited and privileged position which
interstate commerce enjoyed under the older conceptions that "interstate com-
merce cannot be taxed at all," or "interstate commerce may not be taxed di-
rectly."'28 Such is the thrust of what was clearly intended by Justice Stone as a
definitive review and restatement in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue.29
Perhaps the most comprehensive brief statement of the position is that of Justice
Rutledge, concurring in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone:
"[I]t is enough for me to sustain the tax imposed in this case that it is one
clearly within the state's power to lay insofar as any limitation of due pro-
cess or 'jurisdiction to tax' in that sense is concerned; it is nondiscrimina-
tory, that is, places no greater burden upon interstate commerce than the
state places upon competing intrastate commerce of like character; is duly
apportioned, that is, does not undertake to tax any interstate activities
carried on outside the state's borders; and cannot be repeated by any other
state."30
Even first-stage analysis should be enough to show that this consensus, this
formulation, is inadequate to perceive and to appraise the interests involved in
the impact and operation of some of our more common taxes. Whatever their in-
trinsic merit and inevitable appeal, equality and egalitarianism are not the pass-
words to solution of the problems of maintaining an open economy in a federal
system. Starting with a great reluctance to question state taxes, more often
than not limiting himself to an inquiry whether jurisdiction to tax existed and
apparently feeling that that was the extent of his duty and authority, Justice
Frankfurter has perceived, presumably from experience on the Court, that
policies wise abroad may not be without wisdom internally, and that constitu-
tional imperatives may be discovered to support at least some of them.
Certainly in his first years on the Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter would
have found no broader grounds for restraints upon state taxing power than
those implied by Justice Rutledge. Concurring in State Tax Comin'n v. Ald-
rich, he wrote:
"The taxing power of the States was limited by the Constitution and the
original ten amendments in only three respects: (1) no State can, without
the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports,
except as necessary for executing its inspection laws, Art. I, § 10 [2] ; (2)
no State can, without the consent of Congress, lay any tonnage duties, Art.
I, § 10 [3] ; and (3) by virtue of the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8 [3],
no State can tax so as to discriminate against interstate commerce. 31
27. See id. at 254-55.
28. Ibid.
29. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
30. 335 U.S. 80, 96-97 (1948). See also Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337
U.S. 662, 666-67 (1949).
31. 316 U.S. 174, 182 (1942).
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In indicating that discriminatory taxes were so clearly self-classifying as to
warrant grouping them with, and in the lonely company of, those taxes explicit-
ly prohibited by the Constitution, the Justice was consistent with the view ex-
pressed earlier in his commerce clause lectures, where he had indicated surprise
that in Brown v. Maryland 32 Chief Justice Marshall had not based his decision
invalidating the tax upon the fact that it was discriminatory against foreign
commerce
3 3
But to a generation less empirically minded than our own, discrimination
was not so inherently the basis of classification explicit or implicit in the Con-
stitution. It was apparently not a quirk of the Marshall mentality, nor a tactic
in the long-range constitutional strategy sometimes attributed to him, that led
the Chief Justice not to dwell upon discrimination in Brown v. Maryland any
more than he had in McCulloch v. Maryland,34 where it might have been equally
relevant. If we look to the report of argument there is no evidence that counsel
stressed the discriminatory nature of the tax as particularly significant. Some-
what to the contrary, Meredith and Wirt argued that if these general license
laws, as they termed them, were upheld, then Maryland might "establish a tariff
of discriminating duties for herself, and affect, if not defeat, the commercial
policy of the country. '35 But the discrimination with which they were con-
cerned was not against foreign, and in favor of domestic, goods. Rather it was
among foreign nations "in direct repugnancy to the policy of the Union." 36
If it is important that we see the historical record aright, then it should be
noted that Marshall at least gave the appearance of being prepared to uphold
a tax despite its discriminatory effect against foreign commerce. The statutory
provision specifically at issue in Brown v. Maryland was an amendment exact-
ing a license fee of "importers of foreign articles ... and other persons selling
the same by wholesale."'3 7 This amendment was held unconstitutional. The
statute to which it had been added imposed a license fee upon retailers, but, in
its first section, defined "retailer," so far as here relevant, as one "engaged in
the selling of any goods, wares and merchandise, except such as are the growth,
produce and manufacture of the United States."'38 This was as discriminatory
as the license tax on importers selling at wholesale, yet Marshall's indication
that the area of constitutional protection extended only to the first sale, and
while goods were in the original package, clearly appears to have contemplated
that the retailer would have been required to pay the fee, discriminatory against
imported goods, from which the wholesaler was constitutionally exempted. Nor
could Marshall have been unaware of this possibility, for Justice Thompson's
32. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 266 (1827).
33. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 37.
34. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 159 (1819).
35. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 269.
36. Id. at 276.
37. Maryland Laws 1821, c. 246.
38. Maryland Laws 1819, c. 184.
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dissent charged the majority with making a meaningless differentiation between
wholesalers and retailers.39 To this point, Marshall made no effective answer.
This slight excursion into history is, it should be dear, not designed to ad-
duce controlling authority to uphold state taxes discriminatory against, and
hostile to, foreign or interstate commerce. It is designed only to buttress a
thesis which should require but slight support, the conclusion that decisions
condemning such statutes were by no means inevitable-that they were products
of judicial responsibility, and were arrived at by a process which warrants
similar assumptions of responsibility when the interests involved and the actions
taken are of comparable significance. When Justice Field came to write the
opinion in Welton v. Missouri, rejecting the possibility which Marshall had
apparently contemplated, 40 he found the task not a simple one, if we may judge
by the product. The result seems inevitable if we may apply the standard of
the clear needs of a sound federal system, but stating it in terms of explicit
constitutional imperatives is another matter.
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY: PRAGMATIC DIFFICULTIES
Having spent possibly unnecessary time and words in indicating that what
we may call antidiscrimination decisions in the commerce field were not in-
evitable, let us turn to consider why they may not be adequate. For that is the
lesson which Justice Frankfurter appears to have learned; or perhaps, one
should say, to have sensed. For it is true that the opinions do not yield a rich
harvest of evaluative explanation-though they are seldom more sparse in that
respect than the opinions in opposition. However, statements such as those in
Freeman v. Hezeit that the tax is unconstitutional because "a direct tax on
commerce" have worthy precedent even if not the merit of self-illumination. 41
Alexander Bickel has recently pointed out that Justice Brandeis customarily
contented himself with this formulation rather than going more deeply, at least
in explicit terms, into the factors possibly involved in decision. 42 And there is
the constant reminder of that discerning Justice's somewhat surprising remark,
which must appear particularly perverse to those for whom discrimination or
its absence is the sole and controlling standard, "the imposition would have
been void, not because it resulted in discrimination, but because the fee would
be a direct burden on interstate commerce." 43
Let us go, if we may, somewhat beyond direct burdens and consider the in-
terests involved in a few of the taxes with which the Supreme Court has con-
cerned itself in recent years. There is room for difference of opinion concern-
ing trade policy, external and internal, but confidence in decisions is inspired
only by a belief first in the Court's awareness, and then in its appraisal, of the
39. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at288.
40. 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
41. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
42. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUsTIcE BRANDEIS 115-18 (1957).
43. State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
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interests involved. A tariff policy legislatively determined solely or largely in
terms of its effects, beneficial or burdensome, upon the mercantile group who
distribute goods, would seem singularly myopic. There seems little reason why
adequately conceived judicial action in analogous situations should not also take
into account interests beyond the immediate. Occasions arise when an unwill-
ingness to attribute to the Supreme Court something akin to whimsical per-
verseness leads one to conclude that it did not understand even the immediate
operation of a decision ;44 at other times,' verbal formulae of questionable rele-
vance seem to have obscured what a little arithmetic would have cleared up.45
Fortunately these occasions are relatively rare. But it is also rare, unfortunately,
that the Court gives evidence of having gone, even in its thought, beyond ab-
stractions and shibboleths such as "apportionment," "direct burdens," "multiple
burdens," "discrimination," and "interstate commerce must pay its way." Such
symbols and slogans may serve as rallying points, but they offer not a great
deal in either understanding or guidance. Without pretending to any great
capacity for economic analysis, one can still go slightly further.
State Taxation of Interstate Transportation
Let us look first at a tax on transportation, or the proceeds therefrom, so far
as it applies to interstate or foreign commerce. There has been division of
opinion concerning apportioned taxes on transportation within recent years.
The flat statement has been made that a state tax on interstate transportation,
apportioned to transportation within the state, is unobjectionable. 4 Certainly
such a tax demonstrates no apparent discrimination or hostility against inter-
state commerce, and apportionment introduces the egalitarian appeal of "con-
tributing its due" which to some not only requires but even permits no answer.
Is the only objection the abstract one that the tax is "directly on commerce" ?
It is of course true that a tax apportioned to the segment of a journey within
the taxing jurisdiction is less burdensome, in many ways less objectionable
than a tax computed on the distance or the proceeds of the whole journey. But
does this necessarily clear the skirts of the apportioned tax? One need not go
back to the castles on the Rhine and the Loire, to the hazards and burdens of
the overland routes to the Far East, in order to measure the power and ascer-
tain the position of the tolltaker on a strategic trade route.47 Our own pre-
constitutional history discloses that the ports and the states astride the trade
routes exploited their situation to the disadvantage and displeasure of their less
strategically situated neighbors, and that recriminations and reprisals resulted.
On more than one occasion, The Federalist refers to this unhappy situation and
holds out the promise that the proposed Constitution will end it.4s Madison
described the situation as graphically as any when he wrote:
44. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).
45. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947).
46. See Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1951).
47. Cf. CONDLFE, THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS chapters I-V (1950).
48. E.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. VII, at 37-38 (Hamilton), XXII, at 131-32 (Hamilton),
XXXIII, at 202 (Hamilton), and XLI, at 267-68 (Madison) (Modern Library ed. 1937).
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"The other source of dissatisfaction was the peculiar situation of some
of the States, which having no convenient ports for foreign commerce,
were subject to be taxed by their neighbors, thro' whose ports, their com-
merce was carried on. New Jersey placed between Phila & N. York, was
likened to a cask tapped at both ends; And N. Carolina, between Virg" &
S. Carolina to a patient bleeding at both Arms.
49
Marshall, not uninformed of the circumstances leading to the adoption of the
Constitution, closes his opinion in Brown v. Maryland by invoking, had the
result been otherwise, what he apparently assumes to be the clearly impermis-
sible possibility of state taxes on the transit of goods passing through the juris-
diction.50 For these purposes it matters not whether the exaction is a tariff or
toll on the entrance of goods, or a tax on transportation. In fact, if a port area
is involved, the tax on transportation may well lie more heavily upon consumers
in the hinterland, who depend upon transit through and beyond the port. The
tariff or toll on entrance will fall upon the people of the port area as well as
those beyond, and this may well exert a moderating influence in its imposition.
But the tax on transportation falls only on those in remoter areas beyond the
port and, accordingly, may tend to rise to the level of what the traffic will bear.
History need hardly be invoked. As through traffic equals, exceeds or pre-
dominates over local in any jurisdiction-port, passage, city, county or state-
a tax on transport, apportioned with whatever show of fairness one desires, can
clearly be imposed at diminishing relative cost to the local taxpayers and voters.
Outsiders with no voice in the determination of the tax will bear an increasing-
ly large share of the burden. This is a cheap and domestically attractive way
to finance a government, where opportunity offers. Not coincidence, but geog-
raphy produced a series of such taxes in Pennsylvania in the nineteenth century
and led to the clearest judicial statement concerning them, Justice Miller's
opinion concurring in the Case of the State Freight Tax 5' and dissenting from
the result in State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts.52 Justice Jackson also
developed these considerations in his concurrence in Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Minnesota, where, as it happened, they were of limited relevance; Z3 and
Justice Reed made brief allusion to them in Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Steve-
doring Co.54 One wonders whether apportionment, no matter what its appeal
to the abstraction of equality, could carry the day today if a thinly populated
state such as Arizona, sitting astride the main transportation routes to and
from southern California, adopted a tax on transportation, or the proceeds
therefrom, occurring in the state. Or, if Westchester County in New York, or
Brooke and Ohio Counties in West Virginia, or any of a number of well-posi-
tioned cities, counties or states followed suit, could the federal system tolerate
49. 2 MADISON, WRiTiNGs 395 (Hunt ed. 1901).
50. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 284-85.
51. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
52. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284, 297 (1873).
53. 322 U.S. 292, 307 (1944).
54. 330 U.S. 422, 433-34 (1947).
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one of its component units thus exploiting its geographical position? The his-
tory of the struggles for unimpeded access to ports, navigable streams and trade
routes does not suggest an affirmative answer. If the Court is nevertheless pre-
pared to sanction such taxes, the decision would be cast in more reassuring
form if, in addition to invoking the ideals of local fiscal autonomy and the some-
what disembodied equalism of apportionment, it acknowledged that it was con-
sciously giving warrant to the taxing jurisdiction to exploit its geographical
position at the cost of consumers and producers outside.
The Supreme Court has struck down not only the Pennsylvania taxes already
mentioned,5 but also the apportioned taxes on transportation in Galveston, H.
& S.A. Ry. v. Texas 56 and in Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co.
Justice Frankfurter was in the condemning majority in the latter decision, and
he joined with Justice Jackson in expressing grave and what appear to be
soundly based doubts concerning the decisions in Canton R.R. v. Rogan 57 and
Western Md. Ry. v. Rogan.5 8 These latter recent decisions appear to be among
the few which have tolerated such taxes. Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry.,50 often
summoned as support for the apportioned gross receipts tax,60 is, of course,
with its near contemporary, Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York,0 ' the prod-
uct of Justice Field's specious syllogism to the effect that since a state could
exclude a foreign corporation from doing local business, it could without rais-
ing constitutional issues exact any price it chose for permission. When that
simple approach to the problem of the limits on states in a federal system was
abandoned in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas and succeeding decisions,
Grand Trunk lost any authority it had.62 It had never been a decision dealing
with the merits of a tax on transportation, but only a decision-later repudiated
-that the Court would not look to the merits.
Justice Frankfurter's chief connection with the matter of transportation taxes
occurred in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey ;63 the subsequent appli-
cation of this decision well illustrates the hazards in transference of formula-
tions.64 The case has subsequently been cited as authority for the idea that a
55. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts was effectively overruled in Philadelphia
& So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
56. 210 U.S. 217 (1908). That the tax was apportioned is clear from the statute,
Texas Gen. Laws 1905, c. 141, § 1. Justice Holmes apparently attributed no particular
significance to this, since his opinion did not mention it.
57. 340 U.S. 511, 516 (1951).
58. 340 U.S. 520, 522 (1951).
59. 142 U.S. 217 (1891).
60. See, e.g., Rutledge, J., in Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 666
(1949).
61. 143 U.S. 305 (1892).
62. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910). Cf.
HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMmICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
chapters VI-VIII (1918).
63. 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
64. Cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of
Equalization, 347 U.S. 590, 603 (1954) : "One of the most treacherous tendencies in legal
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state may impose an apportioned tax on interstate transportation, or on its
proceeds.0 5 Indeed, the decision did uphold a New York tax on gross receipts
from certain interstate bus transportation, if apportioned to the part of the jour-
ney taking place in New York. But let the emphasis fall upon the word "certain."
The transportation in question was between the New York City area and the
Rochester-Buffalo area of western New York. Instead of remaining always
within the state by proceeding northward to Albany, then turning west, the bus
company took the then more advantageous route which cut across northern
New Jersey and northeastern Pennsylvania. New York did not attempt to col-
lect a tax on the proceeds of transportation originating in the state and going
to a destination outside. It did attempt to tax this traffic from New York City
to Rochester or Buffalo.
justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, held that New York might tax
but required the state to remit that part of the tax appropriate to the fraction
of the journey taking place in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The Justice seems
unquestionably right in ruling that the travel was in interstate commerce. How-
ever, the result cannot be generalized or extended without caution. If, as appears
the case, the hazard from even apportioned transportation taxes is that of
exploiting geographic position at the cost of the outsider, the hazard does not
exist if New York is allowed to tax traffic beginning and ending within the
state. Therefore, no reason appears to deprive New York of the power to tax;
nor can any reasoned basis be suggested for applying this conclusion to a tax
on interstate transportation in other geographic contexts.
One aspect of the decision is troubling, however. In requiring New York to
remit the tax on that fraction of the fare which corresponded to the fraction of
mileage in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Justice Frankfurter appeared to con-
template that those states might demand a tax on fare attributable to their mile-
age. But their standing to levy a transportation tax would be objectionable,
precisely as New York's was not. For a jurisdictional purist, the fact that some
of the transportation took place outside New York might be enough to diminish
New York's claim; perhaps this alone was implied. So restricted, the decision
lends no support to the general application of apportioned taxes to receipts
from interstate transportation.
Let us pursue one aspect of the decision a step further. It has been said that
for a jurisdictional purist the fact that some transportation took place outside
New York would be enough to justify diminution of the New York tax. But
if jurisdictional concepts within a federal system are, like commerce concepts,
to be shaped for the appropriate or better ordering of the relations of the com-
ponent units, 0 then, once assured that commerce considerations would prevent
New Jersey and Pennsylvania from taxing at all, the holder of this more prag-
reasoning is the transfer of generalizations developed for one set of situations to seemingly
analogous, yet essentially very different, situations."
65. See Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 516 (1951).
66. Cf. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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matic concept of jurisdiction might find little reason to deny to New York a tax
on the entire fare, even though he might have not the slightest temptation to
join in Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion.
A somewhat different tax, though still involving transportation, evoked a
major dissent from Justice Frankfurter, and marked clearly his turn away from
the early and acquiescent dissent in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines,
Inc. 67 Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice involved a Maryland statute which
exacted from the owner of any vehicle operated as a common carrier a tax of
two per cent of the value of the vehicle before it could be used on the state's
highways.6 8 The tax was sustained by a majority of the Court which recited
the ancient learning that a state may require, even from purely interstate
operators, a fair price for the use of the highways which it constructs and main-
tains. Major bus lines operating interstate had challenged the tax. To one with
a rudimentary familiarity with the geography of the Atlantic seaboard and with
even the most generalized knowledge of the character and volume of the through
north-south traffic necessarily using a few miles of Maryland's highways-
matters certainly not beyond the confines of judicial knowledge, or notice-
reference to a fair price, thus computed, for use of the highways is indeed the
incantation of an empty formula. A reading of Justice Frankfurter's dissent
will recall the legislative hobbles upon rail traffic 6 9 -stopping all trains at every
county seat, and the like 7°--which the Court for years tolerated until the de-
mand for, and the demands of, an efficient rail transportation 9ystem were per-
ceived. That the states build and maintain highways-in part-and that they
should be allowed a price for use can be granted without viewing Capitol Grey-
hound and other present-day versions of Grand Trunk and Horn Silver as
embodiments of greater wisdom or understanding than the originals. Perhaps
-though the issues as abstractly stated appear unrelated-Castle v. Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc., more recently decided, offers a promise that, with Justice
Frankfurter, the Court has come to have a somewhat greater perception of the
significance of a nationwide system of highway transportation.71
Economically and politically analogous to transportation taxes exploiting
geographical position are taxes on extraction or processing of materials where
the taxing jurisdiction approaches a monopoly position and consumption is
largely outside the state. The unfortunate potentialities are obvious, yet it has
proved difficult to discover mechanisms for classification or workable criteria
for judgment which will tend to separate cases calling for condemnation from
those where a tax should clearly be sustained. This difficulty may explain why
even such a clear exploitation as the Pennsylvania tax on processing anthracite
67. 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940).
68. 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
69. Id. at 548.
70. See POWEIX, VAGARIES AND VARIEsIF IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRFTATION 177-
78 (1956). See also cases collected in the opinion of Justice Reed in Morgan v. Virginia,
328 U.S. 373, 378-79 nn.16 & 17 (1946).
71. 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
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coal was allowed to go unchecked.72 Recently however, the Court was astute
to find that a Texas tax on gathering gas had its stated incidence on the pro-
cess of transportation and was therefore-the conclusion was unanimously
deemed to follow-unconstitutional. 73 The Justices who made up the majority
in Canton R.R. v. Rogan but three years before do not explain the constitu-
tional dichotomy that makes a tax on a process not separate from interstate
transportation invalid in Texas and a tax on the proceeds from interstate (or
even foreign) transportation valid in Maryland.
Sales and Compensating Use Tares
Sales and compensating use taxes upon goods ordered from outside the tax-
ing state, and sales taxes upon those being shipped outside, have produced a
tortuous pattern of decision since Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query provided an
effective breach in what had been thought a constitutional barrier.' 4 As the
injured and indignant quality of his dissent in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co. indicated,75 Chief Justice Hughes could hardly have recognized
the implications and significance of his yielding to the blandishments of the
appeal of equality which was implicit in Gregg Dyeing, and which Justice Car-
dozo made completely explicit in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.70
The barrier breached in the name of equality in Gregg Dyeing appeared for
a time to have been completely leveled in Berwind-White. Indeed, equality
itself appeared to have been the victim as well as the panache of this great vic-
tory, and interstate transactions once immune from tax seemed to have become
disadvantageously subject to multiple taxes. But the Court soon found a spokes-
man in Justice Rutledge and at least a majority who would protect equality as
well as use it as a rallying point against constitutional immunity for interstate
sales. Thus far, no sales or compensating use taxes have been approved when
their impact would have placed the interstate seller at competitive disadvantage
with the local seller. After the comments and analysis of Thomas Reed Powell,
among others, the separate decisions need hardly be traced or analyzed.77
Why should these simple transactions and simple transaction taxes present
72. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). The analogous situation
in the field of price regulation is obvious in Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.,
340 U.S. 179 (1950). As domestic consumption increases and the competitive position
changes, this shades off to a situation like that in Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm
Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939), which in abstract or formal terms may be the same, but
which presents no comparable challenge to a federal system. But cf. Shafer v. Farmers
Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922).
73. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
74. 286 U.S. 472 (1932).
75. 309 U.S. 33, 59 (1940).
76. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
77. See Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes-The Berwind-White Case, 53
HAv. L. REv. 909 (1940); Powell, Note, Sales and Use Taxes: Collection from Absentee
Vendors, 57 HAv. L. REv. 1086 (1944); Powell, More Ado about Gross Receipts Taxes,
60 HAv. L. REv. 501, 710 (1947).
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a continuing problem ? Is it not enough to have removed the interstate sale from
the privileged position of immunity, to have been adequately alert to prevent
the interstate transaction from being taxed more frequently or heavily than its
local competition, and to have wisely made a competitive market the more like-
ly by choosing to accept the tax of the buyer's rather than the seller's state?
Is more involved? Are there other interests to be evaluated? The answer
appears to be that there well may be more, that evaluation is difficult and that
decision should certainly be made with some hesitation, and with consciousness
of its implications.
The issue is a simply stated yet difficult issue of protectionism. Should one
state in a federal system be able to raise its price levels, isolate itself and pro-
tect its markets from the outside price competition thereby stimulated? Or does
the federal system demand at least that degree of economic unity which would
require that consumers and buyers within the state have some measure of access
to a free market outside?
The issue is considered explicitly in Baldwin v. Seelig,78 and only there is it
explicitly dealt with, so far as I know. New York had by legislation raised the
minimum price of milk at all levels from farmer to consumer. The Court held
that the state could not, in its effort to protect its farmers from the outside price
competition thereby generated, prohibit the resale of milk more cheaply pur-
chased. The classic statement is Justice Cardozo's:
"The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy
less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of
the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." 70
When the State of Washington enacted a sales tax, and then sought to pre-
vent movement of buyers to outside markets by the device of the compensating
use tax, it was meeting the same problem which New York had faced and
was dealing with it in similar manner. The opinion upholding the Washington
statute and looking away from Baldwin v. Seelig was assigned to Justice Car-
dozo. T. R. Powell has remarked that "his skill was adequate for the task, or
nearly so.""" This is a nice turn of ironical phrase, but inaccurate measure-
ment. The opinion in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. is not one of the orna-
ments of the Justice's judicial career. Baldwin v. Seelig remains undifferen-
tiated by the observation that there New York sought to project its legislation
within the borders of another state. It did so to the same extent, and only to
the same extent, that a Kansas statute establishing a maximum alcoholic con-
tent for beverages seeks to project itself into the brewing state of Missouri or
the distilling state of Kentucky, or that the Washington statute projected itself
outwards. A few differences can be found between the New York milk statute
and the Washington tax statute; their weight to turn the scale is another ques-
78. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
79. Id. at 523.
80. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 190 (1956).
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tion. New York established a rigid prohibition against the sale of cheap milk
and smothered all price competition. The sales and compensating use tax per-
mit previously existing price competition to continue, but, equally with the New
York legislation, they stifle the enhancement or creation of price competition
which would otherwise take place as a result of the local sales tax. Since nor-
meally no price competition arises between farmers in the sale of milk, this dif-
ference-the fact that New York did not allow existing price competition to
continue-may not be as significant as its statement may suggest. Both New
York and Washington were willing to continue the competitive status quo ante,
but raised to a higher price level. The question remains whether a single state
should be allowed to alter its domestic price level in isolation, unaffected by the
presence of its neighbors.
The issue of protection-not preference, but protection 81-is the issue which
pervades our sales and use tax problems. This issue was recognized, and recog-
nized more freely than it has been here, in the difficult tax adjustments which
were required to initiate the European Coal and Steel Community. As we have
done, the experts of the Community realized that in choosing between the
applicationof excise taxes of a buyer's state and those of a seller's state, com-
petitive markets could better be maintained by permitting the incidence of the
taxes of the former. As we have failed to do, at least explicitly, the Com-
munity's experts have been troubled to recognize that comprehensive applica-
tion of the buying state's excise taxes could create sectors of national protection
within the Community.8 2
The problem confronting the Court has been whether to require that some
avenue to a competitive free market outside the taxing jurisdiction be available
to buyers. For a time, from Hennejord v. Mason through McGoldrick v. Ber-
wind-White and Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,8 3 the triumph of local pro-
tection seemed complete. More recently, Norton Co. v. Department of Reve-
nue 84 and Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland 85 in combination appear to provide
a reasonably workable access to free markets, though one appreciably more re-
stricted than was assumed to exist at the time of Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton.56
81. The idea that protection is usually a mask for preference, and that any tariff
almost inevitably becomes preferential may be so widely accepted as to give some justifi-
cation for Justice Frankfurter's remark: "A tariff barrier between States, moreover, pre-
supposes a purpose to prefer those who are within the barrier . . . ." H. P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 570 (1949). But this is hardly inevitable. Condliffe states
that the Tariff of 1861 was imposed to countervail the competitive effect of high excise
taxes imposed internally to raise revenue. CONDLIFFE, THE CO.MMERCE OF NATIONS 229
(1950). The conclusion is certainly possible, and despite Henneford, the compensating
use tax has both this purpose and effect.
82. See Mendershausen, First Tests of the Schuman Plan, 35 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 269,
278-82 (1953).
83. 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
84. 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
85. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
86. 262 U.S. 506 (1923).
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Divisions and changes in the Court, however, do not assure stability for those
decisions.
There seems little tendency to question Baldwin v. Seelig in its specific con-
text. The sales and use tax decisions do produce sharp divisions. The fact that
both present the issue of protection does not necessarily mean that they must
be undifferentiated. Protection of a rigid price structure imposed by legisla-
tion may or may not involve difficulties and strains quite different from those
resulting from protection of the elevation of a fluid price structure, raised by
the imposition of a comprehensive sales or gross receipts tax. s 7 Competence to
answer that question is not professed here. In so far as meaningful classifica-
tion can be made, the Court in the past appears to have acted generally from
the premise that economic interdependence was the basic requirement of the
federal system, however much single states might be permitted to adopt and
enforce individualized standards of health and safety legislation. Perhaps the
degree of economic segmentation accomplished by successfully protected sales
and use taxes at various levels can be tolerated, but the decision is not one in-
volving only the simple invocation of equality of tax treatment. Equality is the
question, not the answer.
In the succession of sales and use tax cases, Justice Frankfurter has played a
significant part. His opinion for a divided Court in McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth
Co.8 8 marked the first limitation on what had appeared to be the broad scope of
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White. While the Justice addressed himself to the
problem of Arkansas's power to impose its sales tax largely in terms of juris-
diction, as then appeared his custom, and while one may agree with Justice Rut-
ledge that purely jurisdictional considerations did not furnish compelling rea-
sons for denying Arkansas its tax, still another factor made its brief but fore-
shadowing appearance in the opinion: "The very purpose of the Commerce
Clause was to create an area'of free trade among the several States."8' 9 The
technique of making a search for jurisdiction and, that found, regarding the
task as ended, was strongly enough ingrained at the time, however, to produce
the contemporaneous opinion in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Con m'n,
affording what, on any other grounds, had at least the appearance of anomaly.90
The opinion in Freeman v. Hewit 91 marked the fuller development and
application of the idea briefly stated in McLeod v. Dilworth. If the statement
that a direct tax on interstate commerce is prohibited reveals neither the limits
of its applicability nor the values which it serves, it does convey the idea that
economic unity of the nation may require more of the states than abstention
from the hostile and discriminatory. While it does not delineate the edges which
87. Blet cf. VINER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND EcONomic DEVELOPMENT 102 (1952),
suggesting that compensating duties may be justified if extensive internal direct controls
result in a highly artificial price structure.
88. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
89. Id. at 330.
90. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
91. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
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will place accurately all transactions, it does suggest that the exemption of the
cleanly multistate transaction, be it transportation or sale, from state transaction
taxes serves purposes which have expressed the primary values of the federal
system. Freeman v. Hewit was eloquent in its appeal to those values. If few
Justices since Justice Bradley have attempted to explain their operation and
significance, the reason may be that in an age of specialization the task is
thought to lie in the province of the economic analyst.
Freeman v. Hewit is the latest of Justice Frankfurter's opinions in the sales
and use tax field. But his significant presence in the majority in Norton Co.
v. Department of Revenue and his necessary presence in the majority in Miller
Bros. v. Maryland indicate with adequate clarity that the idea emerging and
briefly stated in McLeod v. Dilworth has since become of increasing signifi-
cance to him.
State Property, Income and Inheritance Taxation
The problems arising from the multiple incidence of state property, income
and inheritance taxes are of such iridescent nature that perhaps brief reference
should not even be attempted. One starts with the awareness that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes no geographical limits upon
the taxing power of the United States.92 If the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does impose such limits upon the states, they can hardly
derive from verbal imperative. Rather, the concept of jurisdictional limitation
is employed, as is the commerce clause, for the better and more appropriate
ordering of the federal system. In the absence of congressional definition of
jurisdictional concepts and legislative enforcement, the restraints which have
emerged bear the stamp of judicial responsibility.
A few years ago Professor Bittker argued from the then recent decisions
allowing multiple incidence of state inheritance taxes upon intangibles that the
same result should follow with respect to real estate and tangible chattels. 93 In
Treichler v. Wisconsin, the Court refused to follow this line of thought.94 While
one may question the direction of the movement which Professor Bittker recom-
mended, his arguments against differentiation between tangibles and intangibles
seem eminently sound. Convenience or ease of formulation may raise differ-
ences, but somewhat simplistic thought is required to find it either inevitable or
imperative that land and fixed chattels be taxed in but one state, that property
taxes on moving rolling stock be apportioned and that intangible property and
income may be taxed in several jurisdictions.
What considerations, if any, should call for the judges to devise not sporadic
but generally conceived limitations which may minimize multiple impact of state
property, inheritance and income taxes? Here again the issue is more than
92. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) ; United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1914).
93. Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-State Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947).
94. 338 U.S. 251 (1949).
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avoidance of a competitive disadvantage in local markets for moving or non-
local capital.95 The broader consideration is whether we should seek to pre-
serve or accelerate the mobility of capital.
In a period when great intellectual effort is being devoted to the part which
capital formation and availability plays in economic growth,9 6 when the United
States by a long series of income and estate tax treaties is seeking to increase
the mobility of capital throughout the friendly world,97 it appears appropriate
that some thought be given to the need for mobility of capital within the United
States, and the effect of tax deterrents.98 We can judge only tendencies; but,
other things being equal, an investor will tend to keep his capital at home,
where its yield will be subject to diminution by only one tax, if placing it else-
where will diminish a comparable yield by two. Perhaps the need for capital
mobility within the country is not great, although the even distribution of
development necessary to support this idea seems lacking. Perhaps other
hazards to investment make state tax burdens, softened by the impact of the
federal income tax, relatively unimportant. A more probable conclusion is that
lawyers, through multiple incorporation and related devices which take advan-
tage of the existence of states limiting taxation to encourage business, have
been able to surmount or neutralize barriers with which the judges have re-
mained unconcerned.
The one situation in which economic considerations have clearly required
judicial action has been in the incidence of property taxation on carriers' equip-
ment. A nationwide transportation system sends heavy and expensive equip-
ment into and through many states. If each state in which it appeared could
tax the whole value of that equipment, there would be a strong tendency to a
series of local or, at best, regional transportation systems disjointed by the
absence of equipment interchanges. To meet the need for a larger system it was
possible either to localize taxing power in a single state, or to apportion value
and taxing power among many. For a time we followed the first alternative
with respect to the equipment of carriers by water and the second with respect
to carriers by rail.99 More recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that the
constitutional imperative is the overriding one, rather than the collection of
95. Intangible capital may be placed at a competitive disadvantage after Curry v.
McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939), and State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
96. See, e.g., LEWIs, THE THEORY OF EcONOmic GROWTH (1955) ; The Dynamic So-
ciety, Times Literary Supplement (London), Feb. 24, 1956, p. 109.
97. See Kanter, The United States Income Tax Treaty Program, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 69
(1954).
98. Cf. BRUINs, EINAUDI, SELIGMAN & STAMP, REPORT ON DouBLE TAXATION (League
of Nations 1923) ; REPORT AND REsOLUTIONs OF TECHNICAL EXPERTs, DoUBLE TAXATION
AND TAX EVASION (League of Nations 1925); Bloch & Heilemann, International Tax
Relations, 55 YALE L.J. 1158 (1946).
99. See 61 HARV. L. REv. 1464 (1948) ; see also Powell, Note, Northwest Airlines v.
Minnesota: State Taxation of Airplanes-Herein Also of Ships and Sealing Wax and
Railroad Cars, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1097 (1944).
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specifics, by shifting the treatment of carriers by water-at least on inland
water routes-to accord with that given carriers by rail.100
While the taxation of the equipment of rail and water carriers still followed
different patterns, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota presented the ques-
tion of Minnesota's power to tax the full value of the flight equipment of an
interstate and international airline incorporated in that state and having its
principal business headquarters there.101 Assimilating the situation to that of
a water carrier would have made upholding Minnesota's tax a simple task
under decisions then prevailing. Justice Frankfurter's opinion upholding the
Minnesota tax hardly furnished guides indicating whether other states could
tax as well; apparently, a majority could concur only if the implications of
decision were left unclear. Later, in allowing a state through which an airline
operated to impose an apportioned tax on flight equipment,,the Court has ap-
peared to modify heavily, if not to overrule, the Northwest Airlines decision,
and to assimilate taxation of air carriers' equipment to the pattern which now
prevails for both rail and water carriers. 0 2
CONCLUSION
Justice Frankfurter's dissent from the more recent decision illuminates the
development of his thought. He did not deny, of course, that the state had
jurisdiction to tax. But no single system for apportionment existed. Several
methods, each of which individually imposed no unfair burden on commerce,
but all of which varied markedly, had been developed. The Justice therefore
foresaw "the diverse and fluctuating exercise of power by the various States,
even where based on concededly relevant factors, which imposes an undue bur-
den on interstate commerce.'1 0 3 The themes of this dissent had been sounded
before--over sixty years earlier. They are to be found in the dissent of Justice
Bradley in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania.1' 4 As was usual with
Justice Bradley, his understanding and his prevision were clear, his fears not
unjustified by subsequently developing facts.
Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis have clearly and avowedly been the
predecessors to whom Justice Frankfurter has most frequently looked for wis-
dom to shape his own thought. His experience has brought his understanding
of the economic assumptions of the federal system into growing parallel with
that of Justice Bradley, a fitting member of any trio of judicial guides.
100. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line
Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
101. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
102. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
103. Id. at 605-06.
104. 141 U.S. 18, 33-34 (1891).
